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COMMENTARY
The Constitutional Position of American
Local Government: Retrospect for the
Burger Court and Prospect for the
Rehnquist Court
By M. DAvID GELFAND*
Introduction
In this, the bicentennial year of the United States Constitution, it is
especially appropriate to reexamine the interaction among our political
institutions. This Commentary focuses upon the rarely discussed inter-
action between local government and the federal courts. In particular, it
analyzes the special, though often ambiguous, treatment of local govern-
ment by the United States Supreme Court, especially in constitutional
cases decided during the period in which Warren Burger served as Chief
Justice.
American local governments play, or can play, three principal polit-
ical roles. They can serve as: (1) structures for "community self-deter-
mination," allowing localities to make majoritarian choices about the
nature and style of the community without interference by other polit-
ical institutions, in particular unelected courts; (2) organs for "public
participation," allowing local residents to participate directly in political
* Professor of Law and Executive Director, Center for Legal Studies on Intergovern-
mental Relations, Tulane Law School, New Orleans, Louisiana. B.A., Columbia University,
1971; M. Phil., Oxford University, 1974; J.D., Columbia Law School, 1976. The author grate-
fully acknowledges the research assistance provided by Rebecca King and Robert Abell, and
the editorial comments provided by Terry Allbritton. As this Commentary was completed in
Tokyo at the beginning of my Fulbright grant, I would also like to express my appreciation to
the Japan-United States Educational Commission (for support), my colleagues at Chuo Uni-
versity's Institute of Comparative Law (for invaluable practical assistance), Federal Express
(for reliable service), and the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly editors (for patience). Of
course, statements made herein do not necessarily reflect the views of any of these individuals
or organizations.
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decisionmaking; and (3) providers of public services.1
During the first decade of Chief Justice Burger's tenure, community
self-determination seemed to attain the status of a penumbral, quasi-con-
stitutional principle that provided substantial protection for local govern-
ments against constitutional claims asserted in the federal courts,2
especially claims premised upon the Equal Protection Clause.' Indeed,
in some cases, the Court even deferred to local government decisions
which had severe exclusionary effects or which undercut the important
principle of public participation.4 Yet, during that same period, the Bur-
ger Court acquiesced to congressional expansion of individual rights
against local governments.' Thus, the Court's general pattern was broad
deference toward local government structures and decisionmaking,6 cou-
pled with deference to many congressional determinations (in Constitu-
tional cases) regarding individual rights.7 However, the Burger Court in
that period also erected a limited "state sovereignty" barrier intended to
protect state and local governments from certain kinds of federal inter-
ference with their service-provider role.'
1. More precisely, "community self-determination" and "public participation" can be
viewed as related sub-elements of "self-rule," a perspective on local government that often is
contrasted with a perspective that focuses only upon local government as a "service provider."
See generally Gelfand, The Burger Court and the New Federalism: Preliminary Reflections on
the Roles of Local Government Actors in the Political Dramas of the 1980's, 21 B. C. L. REv.
763, 764-66 (1980) [hereinafter Gelfand, Burger Court Federalism], and sources cited therein.
2. See id. at 799.
3. Id. at 768-80, 799, 834-39. This Commentary is, to some extent, a less detailed com-
panion piece to that 1980 article, as is Gelfand, Local Government in the American Federal
System: The Bicentennial as a Time of Crisis and Opportunity, 19 URB. LAW. (No. 3, Summer
1987) [hereinafter Gelfand, Bicentennia.
4. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 55-56.
6. It must be noted that this was only a general pattern of broad deference to local
government based upon community self-determination, not a situation of complete deference.
During its first decade, the Burger Court did intervene where local government choices had
purposely infringed upon what a majority of the Court perceived to be fundamental interests.
See generally infra note 17 and accompanying text; Gelfand, Burger Court Federalism, supra
note 1, at 790-800.
7. See Gelfand, Burger Court Federalism, supra note 1, at 800-12. In a more recent arti-
cle, Professor Williams agrees that these Burger Court cases "reveal a pattern of solicitude for
localities' structural integrity and a broad judicial deference to their programmatic choices."
Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability ofAmerican Local Government: The Politics of City
Status in American Law, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 84, 104-05, 120-21. Though she does employ the
term "community self-determination," most of her discussion relies upon more straightfor-
ward, descriptive terms- "municipal liability cases" and "local sovereignty decisions"-better
suited to her purpose than the terminology used here and in my 1980 (Burger Court Federal-
ism) article.
8. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). See infra notes 103-106 &
117-124 and accompanying text.
Although limitations of time and space prevent a full exegesis, Part I
of this Commentary examines the development of this pattern in cases
decided during the later years of the Burger Court. Part II considers
some of the questions left open by the Burger Court, regarding the con-
stitutional status of local government, which are likely to confront the
Rehnquist Court in the coming years.
I. Further Reflections: The Burger Court in the 1980's
During the final years of Chief Justice Burger's tenure, the Court
continued its practice of deferring to community self-determination,9
with some interesting new exceptions for protected fundamental rights. 10
The Court also took a somewhat more aggressive stance toward protect-
ing certain aspects of public participation.11 In general, the Court con-
tinued to defer to congressional determinations,"2 though with some
interesting developments regarding civil rights and antitrust liability. 3
Finally, during this period, the Court acknowledged the inadequacy of its
attempt to create a state sovereignty barrier to protect state and local
governments from federal interference with their service-provider role. 4
A. Community Self-Determination Cases
L Deference to Local Programmatic Decisions
As noted above,'" the Burger Court during its first decade broadly
deferred to local government programmatic decisions. Cases arose in
land use, education, public employment, finance, and other fields. 6 Lim-
9. See infra notes 18-36 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 40-54 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 60-91 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 103-106 and accompanying text.
15. See supra text accompanying notes 2-6.
16. Key community self-determination cases decided during that first decade included:
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (racial effects of a municipal at-large election
system held insufficient to establish equal protection or fifteenth amendment violations; pur-
poseful discrimination must be proven); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (upholding
exclusion of resident aliens from teaching in public schools); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (rejecting a takings clause attack upon a broad local historic
preservation law); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977) (racial exclusionary effects of zoning decisions held insufficient to establish an equal
protection violation; purposeful discrimination, based primarily upon the procedural history of
the zoning enactment or decision, must be proven); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,
427 U.S. 50 (1976) (rejecting a first amendment attack upon a zoning dispersion law applied to
"adult businesses," even though the materials involved had not yet been proven to be obscene);
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (reversing, on various grounds, a district court injunction
ordering the creation of a civilian complaint board for a police department found to have a
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ited exceptions were made, however, when a majority of the Court could
agree that there was at stake a fundamental interest substantial enough to
outweigh community self-determination. 7 Much the same pattern has
been followed in the 1980's: broad judicial deference to local deci-
sionmakers, with a few noteworthy exceptions.
a. Land Use
In the field of land use, the decision in City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres 8 continued the Court's deference toward local zoning that af-
pattern of frequent violations of constitutional rights); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975)
(wide range of interested groups held not to have standing to challenge the exclusionary pur-
pose and effects of zoning ordinance); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (district court
exceeded its authority in ordering a metropolitan-wide, interdistrict desegregation plan in the
absence of proof that the school districts being consolidated had themselves committed consti-
tutional violations); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding a single-
family zoning ordinance which defined "family" to include no more than two unrelated per-
sons living and cooking together); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973) (rejecting an equal protection attack upon a school financing system which produced
substantial fiscal disparities among districts); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973) (rejecting an equal protection attack upon a scheme that
allowed only landowners to vote for directors of a local water district and which weighted their
votes according to the value of land owned). Unfortunately, these brief summaries of the
holdings cannot convey the language employed in these and other opinions, the voting patterns
of particular Justices, or the practical implications of the decisions. For a more detailed dis-
cussion, see generally M.D. GELFAND, FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAWV AND AMERICAN
LOCAL GOVERNMENT: A TREATISE FOR CITY ATrORNEYS, PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATORS,
AND STUDENTS 23-25, 39-43, 79-80, 176-82, 197-98, 205, 281-85, 288-91, 299-300, 312-18,
336-46 (1984); Gelfand, Burger Court Federalism, supra note 1, at 767-80, 784-90, 834-39; see
also Williams, supra note 7, at 104-12 (providing a similar analysis of Belle Terre, Arlington
Heights, Milliken, and Rodriguez, and linking the "rhetorical universe" of the opinions to
Jefferson and nineteenth century commentators).
17. Key cases in this category included: Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (ordinance which, as a practical matter, forbade door-to-door solic-
itations by public advocacy groups, was unconstitutionally overbroad); Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) ("family autonomy" protected by the Due Process Clause was
violated by a zoning ordinance'that defined "family" so narrowly as to exclude an extended
family); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (retroactive repeal of bond
covenant violated the Contract Clause where repeal was neither "reasonable" nor "neces-
sary"); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (invalidating a vagrancy
ordinance on vagueness grounds because it failed to give fair notice of forbidden conduct,
allowed arbitrary police action, and made normally innocent behavior criminal). Again, the
context of these and similar cases cannot be conveyed simply by summarizing their holdings.
For a more detailed analysis, see generally M.D. GELFAND, supra note 16, at 112-17, 297-300,
368-71, 384-88; Gelfand, Burger Court Federalism, supra note 1, at 790-800. The wide diver-
gence of views on the Court often made it difficult to predict exactly which rights would fall
within this narrow fundamental rights exception, though some very general patterns did
emerge. See infra text accompanying notes 38-39.
18. 472 U.S. 1006 (1986) (upholding an ordinance that forbade adult motion picture thea-
ters within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, or single or multiple family dwelling, church,
park, or school).
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
fects adult businesses, even in the face of first amendment claims. I9 A
more interesting case is Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,20 in which
the Court concluded that redistribution and deconcentration of land
ownership was a legitimate "public use" for the condemnation of private
property.2 This decision acknowledges the broad authority of state and
local governmental agencies to engage in redevelopment and other inno-
vative land use projects, provided they pay "just compensation." At the
same time, the Burger Court managed to avoid a decision on the hotly
debated topic of whether compensation is required for regulatory actions
that are claimed to result in inverse condemnation.22 In the process,
however, it confirmed the importance of and showed respect for local
government land use procedures in effect requiring landowners to ex-
haust these local administrative procedures before seeking relief in a fed-
eral court.23
19. Renton drew upon Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (re-
jecting a first amendment attack upon a zoning law applied to "adult businesses," even though
the materials involved were not yet shown to be obscene), and, therefore, limited the scope of
Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (town could not place absolute ban on
live nude entertainment).
20. 467 U.S. 229 (1984). Justice O'Connor's opinion was joined by all members of the
Court, except Justice Marshall, who did not participate in the decision.
21. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides that "private property
[shall not] be taken for public use without just compensation." The Takings Clause is made
applicable to state and local governments through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Chicago, B & Q R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1987).
22. In Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (takings clause
attack upon a broad local historic preservation law), and in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255 (1980) (takings clause attack on a land use regulation requiring single unit development), a
majority of the Court concluded that no taking had occurred. In San Diego Gas & Electric
Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (takings clause attack on a land use regulation
designating landowner's undeveloped property as green space), the decision below was deemed
not a final judgment. In Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank,
473 U.S. 172 (1985) (takings clause challenge to land use regulations imposing improvement
requirements and limiting development density), a plurality of the Court concluded that the
challenged decision was not ripe for adjudication because the landowner had failed to seek a
variance through the local government's procedures and had not sought compensation
through procedures provided by the state. Id. at 186-87. In MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v.
Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2651 (1986), a majority ruled that the county planning commission
had to make a final and authoritative determination before the Court could decide whether a
taking had occurred. See generally M.D. GELFAND, supra note 16, at 347-55; Williams, supra
note 7, at 135-37, and sources cited therein.
23. Though the general rule is that plaintiffs do not have to exhaust state administrative
remedies before bringing an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457
U.S. 496 (1982), Williamson County and Yolo County seem to require landowners to seek
relief under state and local land use procedures before bringing an inverse condemnation claim
in federal court. See generally L. McDOUGAL & M.D. GELFAND, MUNICIPAL LAND USE
LIABILITY § 3:08 (1988 forthcoming).
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b. Public Employment
In the field of public employment, Burger Court decisions of the
1980's provide few bright lines for local government officials, lower
courts, or litigants.24 For example, Connick v. Myers 5 sharply curtails
the free speech rights of public employees, but the full extent to which its
fluid language cuts back prior precedent26 remains to be seen.
In Cabell v. Chavez-Salido,27 the Court continued the questionable
practice of upholding, on a case-by-case basis, the exclusion of aliens
from government positions that are not particularly sensitive or signifi-
cant.28 In Branti v. Finkel,29 the Court articulated an even more open-
ended standard for evaluating party patronage dismissals that are chal-
lenged on first amendment grounds.3 0 Finally, sharp divisions within the
24. The employment cases described infra in notes 48-49 & 53 and accompanying text add
further complexity.
25. 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (ruling that an employee survey about practices of the district
attorney's office, distributed to fellow employees, was not protected by the First Amendment).
Justice White wrote the majority opinion. It was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor. Justice Brennan dissented, in an opinion joined by Justices
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Id. at 156 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan con-
tended that the employee survey did address matters of public concern and that it did not
interfere with the operations of the district attorney's office or with the plaintiff's relationships
with her fellow employees. Id. at 169.
26. Justice White concluded that the "limited First Amendment interest involved here
does not require that Connick [the employer] tolerate action which he reasonably believed
would disrupt the office, undermine his authority, and destroy close working relationships."
White also stressed that the Court would not lay down general standards for judging future
statements made by public employees about their superiors. 461 U.S. at 154. Prior cases in
this field are reviewed in M.D. GELFAND, supra note 16, at 139-44.
27. 454 U.S. 432 (1982).
28. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979), had upheld the exclusion of resident aliens
from positions as teachers (who served as "role models"), even though they apparently were
not excluded from serving in the policynaking position of community school board member.
Id. at 81-82 n.15, 86-87 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The ruling in Cabell suffers from a similar
incoherence:
[A] criminal defendant in California may be represented at trial and on appeal by an
alien attorney, have his case tried before an alien judge and appealed to an alien
justice, and then have his probation supervised by a county probation department
headed by an alien. [But after this decision, he] cannot be entrusted to the supervised
discretion of a resident alien deputy probation officer.
454 U.S. at 461 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Subsequently, the Court arrived at the more rea-
sonable conclusion that a statute excluding aliens from the position of notary public violated
the Equal Protection Clause. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984).
29. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
30. The "ultimate inquiry" under Branti "is not whether the label 'policymaker' or 'confi-
dential' fits a particular position; rather, the question is whether the hiring authority can
demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance
of the public office involved." Id. at 518. Justice Stewart dissented, arguing that the Court
should retain the clearer tests of "confidentiality" and "policymaking" developed in their prior
patronage dismissal case, Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). Brand, 445 U.S. at 520 (Stew-
[Vol. 14:635
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Burger Court over affirmative action have resulted in few coherent prece-
dents in this area, though they do provide sufficient authority for local
officials to undertake certain limited forms of affirmative action.3
c. Procedural Limitations
In addition to these decisions32 narrowing the scope of substantive
constitutional rights when in conflict with community self-determination
interests, the Burger Court continued to develop procedural devices that
prevent constitutional attacks upon certain types of local government de-
cisions. For example, in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,33 the Court ap-
proved a standing requirement that makes injunctions against police
misconduct-and, possibly, similar abuses by other lower echelon offi-
cials-extremely difficult to obtain in federal court.34 Similarly, the com-
ity rule articulated by Justice Rehnquist in Fair Assessment in Real
Estate v. McNary35 substantially reduces the number and type of federal
art, J., dissenting). Justice Powell dissented in Branti, as he had in Elrod, presenting the more
general objection that patronage practices actually contributed to state and local government
self-rule. Id. at 521 (Powell, J., dissenting).
31. See, e.g., Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019
(1986); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448 (1980); and Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), each requir-
ing careful analysis of a range of opinions. In Wygant, Justice O'Connor hazarded the follow-
ing synthesis:
The Court is in agreement that, whatever the formulation employed, remedying
past or present racial discrimination by a state actor is a sufficiently weighty state
interest to warrant the remedial use of a carefully constructed affirmative action pro-
gram. This remedial purpose need not be accompanied by contemporaneous find-
ings of actual discrimination ... as long as the public actor has a firm basis for
believing that remedial action is needed.
Wygant, 106 S.Ct. at 1853 (O'Connor, J., concurring). However, her description of a "care-
fully constructed" program seems rather narrow. See id. at 1853-55.
32. See also Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986) (negligence alone is insufficient to
establish a due process violation by a jail official); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)
(holding that students are protected by the Fourth Amendment, but articulating a more re-
laxed standard for permissible student searches); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983) (one of
many cases articulating rights for prisoners while deferring broadly to disciplinary decisions of
prison officials); City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981) (upholding the city's decision
to close a street, despite its racial impact); Heffron v. International Soe'y of Krishna Con-
sciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (upholding restrictions upon the location, for both sale
and free distribution, of religious literature at a state fair); see generally M.D. GELFAND, supra
note 16, at 215, 236-78, 391-93.
33. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
34. Though the Lyons petitioner had been injured before bringing suit, the Court denied
him standing to sue for an injunction because he was not presently suffering from, nor could he
show a sufficient likelihood that he would suffer in the future from, the challenged policy of
administering chokeholds to citizens stopped for routine traffic violations. Id. at 105. The
difficulties of this standing requirement are manifest if, for instance, police adopted a policy of
shooting citizens stopped for routine traffic violations.
35. 454 U.S. 100 (1981).
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court suits that can be brought to challenge the administration of state
and local tax schemes.36
2. Exceptions for Fundamental Rights
As noted above,37 the broad judicial deference that marked the Bur-
ger Court's first decade was somewhat balanced by intermittent protec-
tion of certain fundamental interests when they were found to outweigh
community self-determination. As the cases demonstrated, this funda-
mental rights exception was very narrow in scope, appearing to apply
only to claims arising under explicit constitutional protections, 38 when
no detailed examination of local government processes was required, or
when the community self-determination interest itself was weak.39
During the 1980's, there again were a number of cases in which indi-
vidual rights prevailed over community self-determination. For example,
in Plyler v. Doe," the Court ruled that denying illegal alien children ac-
cess to free public education violated the Equal Protection Clause. Not-
ing that denial of a basic education imposed "a lifetime hardship on a
discrete class of children not accountable for their disabling status," Jus-
tice Brennan applied an intermediate scrutiny standard, which required
the challenged statute to further a substantial interest or goal of the
state.41 Although this was a somewhat unusual posture for a majority of
the Burger Court to assume, the concurring opinions by Justices Black-
36. The principle of comity enunciated by then Justice Rehnquist would require plaintiffs
to pursue most of their federal constitutional challenges to such schemes in state court.
37. See supra text accompanying note 17.
38. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (First
Amendment violated by an ordinance that directly and substantially restricted door-to-door
and on-street financial solicitations by public advocacy organizations); United States Trust Co.
v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (Contract Clause prohibits impairment of a covenant between
two states and bondholders). During the 1970's, challenges brought under constitutional pro-
visions such as the Equal Protection Clause generally did not give rise to an exception to the
Court's pattern of deferring to the programmatic choices of local governments. See, e.g., Vil-
lage of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
39. See sources cited supra note 17.
40. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). See generally M.D. GELFAND, supra note 16, at 183-88.
41. 457 U.S. at 224. See also id. at 217-18. Justice Powell described the intermediate
scrutiny test as follows: "In these unique circumstances, the Court properly may require that
the State's interests be substantial and that the means bear a 'fair and substantial relation' to
these interests." Id. at 239 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Marshall also concurred in Plyler.
He relied, however, upon the sliding scale for equal protection analysis proposed in his Rodri-
guez dissent. See id. at 230-31 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Chief Justice Burger countered that the Plyler majority had simply "patch[ed] together
bits and pieces of what might be termed quasi-suspect-class and quasi-fundamental-rights anal-
ysis" to construct a theory of heightened scrutiny "custom-tailored" to the Plyler facts. Id. at
244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). For a general discussion of the levels of judicial scrutiny under
mun and Powell stressed that the essential holding of San Antonio In-
dependent School District v. Rodriguez42 remained undisturbed-that
education is not a fundamental right requiring all types of state and local
restrictions to be justified on the basis of a compelling state interest.43
Indeed, they observed, the Plyler outcome essentially sprang from dictum
in Justice Powell's majority opinion in Rodriguez.' Significantly, the
Plyler ruling did not require a detailed analysis of the local financing
scheme.
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,45 the Court in-
validated a zoning ordinance requiring a special use permit for a pro-
posed group home for mentally retarded persons. The claim was based
on a denial of Equal Protection. Although purporting to employ a ra-
tional relationship test, the Cleburne Court actually took a fairly in-
terventionist stance. This decision built upon Moore v. City of East
Cleveland," which had invalidated a single-family zoning ordinance that
effectively outlawed extended families. Both cases, therefore, limited an
overly expansive reading of the very broad deference to residential zon-
ing articulated in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas.47 Yet, like Moore, the
Cleburne ruling could be limited to a discrete set of circumstances and
did not involve the Court in a detailed examination of local land use
procedures.
the Equal Protection Clause, see M.D. GELFAND, supra note 16, at 58-60, and sources cited
therein.
42. 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (described supra note 16).
43. See 457 U.S. at 235 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 238-39 nn.2-3 (Powell, J., con-
curring). Justice Blackmun had joined Justice Powell's majority opinion in Rodriguez. See
also Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983) (upholding a residency requirement for tuition-
free public education).
44. Justice Powell's Rodriguez opinion had reserved judgment on the constitutionality of a
system that "occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of its children
.... " 411 U.S. at 37. See also id. at 25 (noting that the financing scheme upheld in Rodriguez
did not result in "absolute denial of education").
45. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985). Justice White's opinion for the Court was joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O'Connor. Justice Stevens filed a
separate concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice Burgerjoined. Id. at 3260-63 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part, arguing
that the appropriate standard was a fully articulated sliding scale, such as he had suggested in
Rodriguez and Plyler. See supra note 41. Justice Marshall's Cleburne dissent was joined by
Justices Brennan and Blackmun. 105 S. Ct. at 3263-77 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
46. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
47. 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (described supra note 16). For a discussion of the relationship be-
tween Belle Terre and Moore prior to the Cleburne decision, see Gelfand, Burger Court Feder-
alism, supra note 1, at 791-93. The current situation is discussed in L. McDoUGAL & M.D.
GELFAND, supra note 23, §§ 2:12-2:13.
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In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill,48 the Court required
a pretermination hearing for public employees who have acquired a prop-
erty interest in continued employment. Though it might have resulted in
detailed judicial examination of local government employment practices,
the Loudermill holding required only that the employee be given notice
and an opportunity to be heard. Consistent with its deferential treatment
of local government practices, the Court did not prescribe any particular
form of hearing. 49
Similar to the Court's revival of the Contract Clause 0 in the
1970's,' several cases decided during the 1980's have revived the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause. 2 Most of these cases relate to employment
opportunities, 3 and they do represent an expansion of individual rights.
In summary, the Burger Court's deference to community self-deter-
mination has preserved the programmatic flexibility of local governments
in a variety of fields. As a result, civil rights and civil liberties litigants
are denied many of the constitutional litigation opportunities they had
enjoyed during the Warren Court era. When the precedents upholding
fundamental rights are read together, however, it is clear that some pos-
sibilities remain for those who employ creative litigation strategies.54
48. 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985).
49. Id. at 1493-94. See also M.D. GELFAND, supra note 16, at 99-112 (analyzing prior
procedural due process cases).
50. The Contract Clause provides: "No State shall... pass any ... Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts. .. ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
51. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (described supra note
17); see also Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978) (also closely scruti-
nizing a state's modification of private contractual relations); see generally Gelfand, Burger
Court Federalism, supra note 1, at 796-98.
52. The Privileges and Immunities Clause applied in these cases provides: "The Citizens
of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several
States." U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2. It should not be confused with the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause of section one of the Fourteenth Amendment which, currently, has a narrower
scope.
53. See, e.g., Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 275 (1985) (invalidat-
ing residency requirement for bar admission); Camden United Bldg. & Constr. Trades v. City
of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984) (ordinance requiring 40% of the employees of contractors
and subcontractors working on city construction projects to be city residents may violate the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, even though it would not violate the Commerce Clause);
Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978) (invalidating resident-hiring preference for employ-
ment related to development of the state's revenues). See also Austin v. New Hampshire, 420
U.S. 656 (1975) (invalidating on privileges and immunities grounds a tax which applied only
to commuters).
54. Often a constitutional claim will have to be cast in an unusual or unexpected mold.
See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 5, 71-74 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (system dis-
tributing dividends from Alaska's natural resources fund based upon years of state residency
should be invalidated on right to travel and privileges and immunities clause grounds); Board
of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (plurality opinion) (recognizing the "right to receive
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3. Congressional Intervention
As noted above, during its first decade the Burger Court, while in-
terpreting constitutional rights fairly narrowly, acceded to congressional
expansion of individual rights claims5" against local government.5 6 In
general, this pattern continued during the 1980's,57 though some cases
ideas"); DeWeese v. Town of Palm Beach, 812 F.2d 1365 (11th Cir. 1987) (invalidating ordi-
nance requiring men to wear shirts when appearing in public, on the ground that it violated the
liberty interest in personal dress of a shirtless jogger and did not bear a rational relationship to
any legitimate town interest); Service Mach. & Shipbuilding v. Edwards, 617 F.2d 70 (5th
Cir.), aff'd, 449 U.S. 913 (1980) (invalidating workers' identity card and registration scheme
on dormant commerce clause grounds); Wallace v. Town of Palm Beach, 624 F. Supp. 864
(S.D. Fla. 1985), appeal dismissed, 809 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1987) (invalidating a similar
registration scheme on commerce clause grounds). The author represented the prevailing par-
ties in DeWeese, Service Machine, and Wallace.
55. See, eg., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980) (accepting discrimina-
tory effect as the standard under the Voting Rights Act, even though discriminatory purpose is
required under the Equal Protection Clause); Gladstone v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91
(1979) (accepting congressional expansion of standing); Monell v. Department of Social Serv-
ices, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipalities are potential defendants in suits under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 413 (1978) (anti-
trust liability of municipalities); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (holding that
height and weight requirements for prison guards violated the discriminatory effect standard of
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act); Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976) (accepting
broad remedial order where federal agency involved); see also Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 271 (1977) (finding no equal protection viola-
tion because purposeful discrimination not proven, but remanding for consideration of the
claim under the Fair Housing Act). But see New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568
(1979) (applying the discriminatory effect standard of Title VII very restrictively in a public
employment case). See generally M.D. GELFAND, supra note 16, at 48-53, 63, 88-89, 94; Gel-
fand, Burger Court Federalism, supra note 1, at 800-09, 811-12.
56. Although I have consistently presented this same analysis of these Burger Court deci-
sions throughout my 1980 article, Gelfand, Burger Court Federalism, supra note 1, and in
subsequent books and articles, Professor Williams reports that my position is exactly the oppo-
site. See Williams, supra note 7, at 121 n.201. Since she follows, accepts and, at some points,
even cites the 1980 article, I assume that her reversal of my position is simply a typographical
error or similar oversight. I also assume that Professor Williams' description of the analysis in
my 1980 article as "groundbreaking" is a genuine compliment, which I gratefully accept.
Her further characterization of that analysis as "somewhat formalistic" seems to spring
from the differences in our goals. My first purpose in the 1980 article, and in some other
writings, was to identify certain coherent themes in Burger Court decisions (at a time when
most commentators were finding only incoherence there). This was done by viewing a wide
range of cases through a local government lens. Specifically, I sought an explanation-from
the perspective of the opinions' authors themselves-for deference to (elected) local govern-
ment in most constitutional cases, deference to Congress (a superior elected body) in most
statutory cases, and refusal to defer when a statute interfered with the local service-provider
function. The resulting patterns were then critiqued both from internal and external perspec-
tives. Professor Williams' purpose is apparently somewhat different, though we agree on sev-
eral points.
57. See, eg., Thornburg v. Gingles, 106 S. Ct. 2752 (1986) (interpreting the 1982 amend-
ments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which replaced a discriminatory purpose standard
with a discriminatory "results" standard); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (rejecting
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did narrowly interpret particular federal statutes.5" In this connection,
several important developments regarding antitrust and civil rights laws
merit special examination.
The issue of municipal antitrust liability involved an interesting in-
teraction between the Court and Congress. In 1978, the Court ruled that
municipalities were not automatically entitled to the "state action" de-
fense available to states in antitrust cases.59 In 1982, the Court took an
even more dramatic step by ruling that even a grant of home rule author-
ity to a municipality was insufficient to constitute state authorization of
municipal anticompetitive behavior.1° The decision led to several enor-
mous monetary judgments against municipalities,6" set back the home
rule movement by several decades,62 and flew in the face of well estab-
lished precedent providing that federal courts should not interfere with
state-city relations.63 Congress responded to the enormous monetary
awards by passing legislation that essentially forbids antitrust damage
remedies against local governments." Shortly thereafter, the Court ap-
proved more favorable standards, from the perspective of the municipali-
ties, even as to the remaining forms of antitrust liability.
Despite the growing opposition of several Justices, the Burger Court
did not directly retreat from its holding in Monell v. Department of Social
a tenth amendment attack upon an amendment extending the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act to cover public employees).
58. See, eg., Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist. Bd. ofEduc. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176
(1982) (narrowly interpreting the Education for All Handicapped Children Act); Pennhurst
State School v. Halderman (Pennhurst I), 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (narrowly interpreting the Devel-
opmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975).
59. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 413 (1978) (Brennan,
J., writing for a plurality) (local governments seeking to assert the defense must be acting
"pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service").
60. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 54 (1982) (Bren-
nan, J.) (insisting, inter alia, that America is a "nation not of 'city-states' but of States").
61. The enormity of the awards resulted, in part, from the mandate of the Clayton Act
that antitrust damage awards "shall be trebled." 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1982).
62. See generally Freilich & Carlisle, The Community Communications Case: A Return to
the Dark Ages Before Home Rule, 14 URB. LAW. v. (1982); Williams, supra note 7, at 125-26
n.220, 131-34, and sources cited therein. Professor Williams presents an interesting analysis,
which links Justice Brennan's antitrust opinions to his Monell opinion and his position on
sovereign immunity. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959);
Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
64. Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 16-36 (1986).
65. See Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 106 S. Ct. 1045 (1986); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau
Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985); see generally Greilsheimer, Potential Liabilities of Issuers and Other
Parties, in STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT FINANCING § 12:08.10 (M.D. Gelfand
ed. 1986 Supp.).
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Services66 that individuals whose constitutional rights are violated can
sue local governments directly under section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act.67 Indeed, the principal68 question left open in the Monell opinion
was resolved favorably to the plaintiffs in Owen v. City of Independence.69
In Owen, a closely divided Court70 ruled that local governments sued in
section 1983 suits could not assert the "good faith immunity" defense
that was available to their officers.71 As Justice Brennan, writing for the
majority, explained:
The innocent individual who is harmed by an abuse of governmen-
tal authority is assured that he will be compensated for his injury.
The offending official, so long as he conducts himself in good faith,
may go about his business secure in the knowledge that a qualified
immunity will protect him from personal liability for damages that
are more appropriately chargeable to the populace as a whole.72
In most cases, this approach will produce a fairly equitable system of
compensation, depending upon how far other defenses are expanded or
contracted. Justice Powell, however, was prompted to write in his dis-
sent that municipalities had gone "in two short years from absolute im-
munity under § 1983 to strict liability." 73
The Court opened the door of municipal liability even further in two
66. 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipalities are "persons" and, therefore, potential defendants
in suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but they will not be liable solely on a respondeat superior
theory).
67. Section 1983 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Its jurisdictional counterpart is 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1982). For
detailed discussions of various aspects of litigation under section 1983, see SECTION 1983:
SWORD AND SHIELD (R. Freilich & R. Carlisle eds. 1983); M.D. GELFAND, supra note 16, ch.
6; S. NAMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION (1984).
68. The other open question involved the "contours of municipal liability." 436 U.S. at
695. See infra notes 74-79 & 83-86 and accompanying text.
69. 445 U.S. 622 (1980). See generally M.D. GELFAND, supra note 16, at 424-27.
70. In Owen, Justice Brennan's majority opinion was joined by Justices White, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens. Justice Powell's dissenting opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist. Id. at 658 (Powell, J., dissenting).
71. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (absolute immunity for judges);
Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (qualified or "good faith" immunity for prison
officials); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (qualified immunity for school board mem-
bers). For a discussion of more recent cases dealing with these personal defenses, see infra
note 89 and accompanying text.
72. 445 U.S. at 657.
73. Id. at 665 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
648 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 14:635
cases decided in the same year as Owen. In Maher v. Gagne74 and Maine
v. Thiboutot," the Court held that the reference in section 1983 to "dep-
rivation of any rights... secured by the Constitution and laws' 7 6 should
be read literally, thereby allowing section 1983 suits based upon viola-
tions of federal statutes, including non-civil rights statutes.
The opponents of Monell, however, have also been active in the
1980's. Although they have not succeeded in overruling the decision,
they have placed several significant limitations upon section 1983 suits
brought against local governments and state and local officials. For ex-
ample, the broad contours of Maher and Thiboutot were quickly reduced
by decisions severely limiting the number and type of statutory claims
which can be pursued under section 1983." 7 As a result, a statutory sec-
tion 1983 claim will not lie if the statute: (1) does not create an enforcea-
ble right; (2) provides its own exclusive remedy for violations of its terms;
or (3) creates a sufficiently comprehensive remedial scheme.78 Read to-
gether, these cases produce an anomalous outcome: some business-ori-
ented statutory claims can be asserted under section 1983, while many
other statutory claims cannot, even though they are closer to the more
traditional civil rights actions.79
In addition, the "under color of state law"80 requirement of section
1983 has been severely restricted by several Burger Court decisions of the
1980's.81 As a result, privately owned institutions that have enormous
influence over the lives of citizens and that receive substantial govern-
74. 448 U.S. 122 (1980).
75. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
76. See supra note 67.
77. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1
(1981); Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (Pennhurst I).
78. Middlesex, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); Pennhurst, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). See generally M.D. GEL-
FAND, supra note 16, at 432-35.
79. We obviously have come a long way from the "original intent" of the drafters of
section 1983, who, in 1871, were concerned about guaranteeing a federal court forum in which
recently freed blacks could assert their new civil rights under the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments (and closely related statutes).
80. See supra note 67. This phrase means that a section 1983 action can be brought only
when "the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right [is] fairly attributable to
the State" (or its political subdivisions). Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937
(1982). This is the same as the test for "state action" under the Fourteenth Amendment, so
both sets of precedents are applicable.
81. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (state action requirement not met
despite allegations that state and federal regulations had encouraged the challenged actions by
defendant private nursing home and that 90% of the patients' medical expenses were paid by
the state); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (no state action by private school, even
though nearly all its students were referred by public schools and had fees paid by government
agencies); Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981) (public defender, though paid by the
state, did not act "under color of" state law); see also Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419
mental support are generally immune from section 1983 suits. Further-
more, sovereign immunity has become a more effective and powerful
defense for state agencies and their officials as a result of Justice Powell's
rereading of the precedents in the Court's second decision in Pennhurst
State School v. Halderman.2 In fact, that opinion provides a possible
defense for local governments in a limited set of circumstances.8 3 A
more supportable position was taken by the Court in City of Newport v.
Fact Concerts,84 which held that punitive damages cannot be claimed
against local governments in section 1983 suits. 85 Also, various proce-
dural issues have been resolved by reference to state law.86
In another set of recent cases, the Court tinkered in important ways
with the calculation of attorney's fees in section 1983 and other civil
rights cases.87 By making it more difficult for successful civil rights
plaintiffs to recover respectable attorney's fees from local government de-
U.S. 345, 350 (1974) (extensive, detailed regulation of privately owned utility company insuffi-
cient to constitute state action).
82. 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (Pennhurst II).
83. See id. at 123-24 (relieving counties from liability with respect to a joint state-city
institution where the state was protected by sovereign immunity). Fortunately, lower courts
have not given this possible defense an expansive reading. See, eg., Crane v. State of Texas,
759 F.2d 412, 415-20 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 766 F.2d 193 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 106 S. Ct.
570 (1985); Braintree Baptist Temple v. Holbrook Public Schools, 616 F. Supp. 81 (D. Mass.
1984); see generally Lee, Sovereign Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment: The Uses of His-
tory, 18 URB. LAW. 519 (1986).
84. 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
85. Punitive damages, however, can be awarded against individual state or local govern-
ment officials or employees. See Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914 (1984); Smith v. Wade, 461
U.S. 30 (1983). Thus, in some cases, plaintiffs may be able to obtain a punitive damages award
against officials who are indemnified by their governmental employers or insurance policies.
86. State law, unless "inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States"
governs suits brought under section 1983 (or certain other statutes), whenever the latter is
"deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against
law. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). Applying this standard to the rather sparse language of
section 1983, the Court has concluded that state statutes of limitations, survival statutes, and
res judicata rules will generally govern such actions. See generally M.D. GELFAND, supra note
16, at 458-64 (critiquing some of these cases).
87. Plaintiffs prevailing in cases under various civil rights acts (including section 1983)
can recover reasonable attorney's fees from state governments, local governments, and their
officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). Defendants prevailing in these cases can recover attor-
ney's fees only when the plaintiff's claim is "groundless or without foundation." Hughes v.
Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980). See generally M.D. GELFAND, supra note 16, at 464-69.
Legislative immunity of an individual defendant will bar an attorney's fee award, Supreme
Court of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 738 (1980), but judicial immunity will not.
Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984). States cannot assert an eleventh amendment defense to
attorney's fee awards in section 1983 cases because Congress, in passing section 1988, has
abrogated state sovereign immunity from such awards. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678
(1978).
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fendants, these opinions 8 may well reduce the extent to which individual
citizens can act as private attorneys general to enforce constitutional
rights. This result is especially significant at a time when the United
States Attorney General has reduced the extent of federal government
enforcement of civil rights.
Personal defenses for government officials sued in section 1983 cases
were also clarified and expanded somewhat by the Burger Court.89 This
result would have been appropriate, for the reasons noted in Owen,90 if
the liability of governmental entities were correspondingly expanded,
thereby furthering both the compensation and deterrence purposes of
section 1983. As explained above,91 however, the Burger Court has re-
duced governmental entity liability through restrictive interpretations of
substantive constitutional rights and the imposition of various procedural
barriers, often based upon extreme interpretations of community self-
determination.
B. Public Participation Cases
The Burger Court's decisions of the 1980's dealing with public par-
ticipation in community decisionmaking have produced mixed results.
Although "one-person, one-vote" remained the general equal protection
standard for both state and local government election districts, 92 several
members of the Court have indicated their willingness to tolerate greater
deviation from mathematical equality than the majority has, so far, al-
lowed.93 Of more immediate concern was the decision in Ball v. James,94
in which a closely divided Court95 held that a water and electricity dis-
88. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985); Webb v. Board of Educ. of Dyer County, 471
U.S. 234 (1985); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424
(1983); see generally L. McDOUGAL & M.D. GELFAND, supra note 23, § 3:03.
89. See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984); Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984);
Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980); see generally L. McDOUGAL
& M.D. GELFAND, supra note 23, § 3:04.
90. See supra text accompanying note 72.
91. See supra notes 2-4, 16-36 and accompanying text.
92. This standard was established for state legislative districts in Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964), for general purpose local governments in Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S.
474 (1968), and for school districts in Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
93. See White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 798 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring, joined by Bur-
ger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.); see also Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983); Karcher v.
Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 780-84 (1983). (White, J., dissenting); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315
(1973); see generally M.D. GELFAND, supra note 16, at 10-15.
94. 451 U.S. 355 (1981).
95. Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Rehnquist and Stevens. Justice Powell concurred. Id. at 372 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice
White's dissenting opinion was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. Id. at
374 (White, J., dissenting).
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trict with wide-ranging activities could restrict voting for its board of
directors to persons owning land within the district and could distribute
voting power according to the number of acres owned.9 6 In addition, the
Burger Court continued to uphold the questionable practice of excluding
aliens from participation even in some nonsensitive public jobs.9 7
Despite these negative public participation cases, the Court in Rog-
ers v. Lodge9" substantially reduced the burden plaintiffs must bear in
"fair and effective representation" cases.9 9 In the same summer the Rog-
ers decision was handed down, Congress reduced the burden even further
by amending the Voting Rights Act of 19 65 .1'° In addition, the Court,
though rejecting the particular claim before it, opened the door in Davis
v. Bandemer 01 for suits based upon political party gerrymandering. As
a result of these developments, voting rights is likely to be the most ac-
tive area of civil rights litigation during the next five years.' 2
C. Service-Provider Cases
In 1976, Justice Rehnquist, writing for a sharply divided Court in
National League of Cities v. Usery,'0 3 published a decision designed to
protect state and local governments from Congressional interference in
their essential functions. In 1985, Justice Blackmun delivered the major-
ity opinion in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,"°
which overruled National League of Cities. His Garcia opinion, however,
96. Ball built upon and expanded the questionable franchise restriction permitted by
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973). See supra
note 16; see generally M.D. GELFAND, supra note 16, at 26-28.
97. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
98. 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (six to three decision). See also Hunter v. Underwood, 469 U.S.
878 (1985).
99. These cases involve racial voting rights. See generally M.D. GELFAND, supra note 16,
at 37-48; Gelfand, Voting Rights and the Democratic Process: Ongoing Struggles and Continu-
ing Questions, 17 URB. LAW. 333 (1985) [hereinafter Gelfand, Voting Rights].
100. Voting Rights Act Amendment of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134,
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982)) (providing that racial voting dilution claims can be estab-
lished on the basis of discriminatory "results" rather than under the prior discriminatory pur-
pose standard). See generally Thornburg v. Gingles, 106 S. Ct. 2752 (1986).
101. 106 S. Ct. 2797 (1986).
102. Much will depend upon the ability of plaintiffs to prove, and of district courts to find,
the necessary facts. See id. at 2807-09; Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. at 623; 627-28.
103. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Justice Rehnquist's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Powell. Justice Blackmun filed a separate concurring
opinion, which failed to join the issue debated in other opinions. Id. at 856 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). Justice Brennan strongly dissented, in an opinion joined by Justices White and
Marshall. Id. at 856 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also dissented. Id. at 880 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). For listings of some of the many comments on this case, see Gelfand,
Burger Court Federalism, supra note 1, at 812 n.262; Williams, supra note 7, at 113 n.158.
104. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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simply supplied the coup de grace to a decision which had been eviscer-
ated almost from its inception."0 5 Yet, Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in
Garcia, promised a revival of judicial protection for state sovereignty.10 6
II. Open Questions: The Rehnquist Court in the 1980's
Many interesting issues involving the constitutional position of local
government are likely to confront the Rehnquist Court during the re-
maining years of this decade. This section sets forth some open ques-
tions potentially facing the court in the next few years.
A. Community Self-Determination and Public Participation Issues
The principles of community self-determination and public partici-
pation are closely linked. After all, judicial deference to the program-
matic decisions and structural integrity of local government can hardly
be considered legitimate if the local government involved is not selected
fairly. Stated differently, structural integrity is not an end in itself, but
rather a mechanism for furthering certain basic decisions by citizens. 107
A new battleground, pitting Chief Justice Rehnquist against Justice
Brennan,108 has developed regarding the contours of the respondeat su-
perior exclusion from section 1983 suits.1 9 As articulated in the con-
ficting dicta in City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle'10 and Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati,"' the dispute revolves around the extent to which inadequate
105. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.) (four days after National
League of Cities, the Court suggested that state sovereignty is not a barrier to civil rights
statutes); North Carolina v. Califano, 435 U.S. 962 (1978), aff'g 445 F. Supp. 32 (E.D.N.C.
1977) (state sovereignty is not a barrier to Congressional action under the Spending Clause);
Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978) (not a barrier to action under the Taxing
Clause); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980) (not a barrier to congressional
action under the post-Civil War Amendments); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (not a barrier to federal regulation of private activities); United
Transportation Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678 (1982) (not a barrier to federal
regulation of commuter railroad employment practices); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742
(1982) (not a barrier to federal interference with state administrative procedures); EEOC v.
Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (described supra note 57); see generally Gelfand, Burger Court
Federalism, supra note 1, at 812-24, 839-46.
106. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 579 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
107. This argument is further developed in Gelfand, Bicentennial, supra note 3; Gelfand,
Voting Rights, supra note 99.
108. Prior disputes have involved the approach to the dormant Commerce Clause and to
the rational relationship test for the Equal Protection Clause.
109. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
110. 105 S. Ct. 2427 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., for plurality) (narrow interpretation of munici-
pal liability standards).
111. 106 S. Ct. 1292 (1986) (Brennan, J., writing for a majority as to several points and for
a plurality as to others) (broader interpretation).
training, incomplete supervision, and overdelegation by governmental
employers can serve as bases for meeting the "policy," or "causation,"
requirement for section 1983 suits.112
Once this important area of law is clarified,113 the next dispute may
well involve sovereign immunity. That is, if directly confronted with the
issue, these two Justices will strongly disagree as to the appropriate treat-
ment of the anomalous, but long standing, situation of allowing oft-
wealthy states to assert the Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity
defense, while denying it to oft-poor municipalities." 4
Though Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Brennan seem to agree
that some type of monetary remedy may be necessary for inverse con-
demnation, the Court has, so far, been unable to identify an appropriate
case which it deems ripe for adjudication on this issue."s Any such
judgment must consider the precise contours of municipal liability very
carefully. 1
16
112. Section 1983 actions can be brought against a person who, acting "under color of a
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, . . . causes" a deprivation of constitutional
(and some statutory) rights. See supra note 67. This clause has been interpreted to allow suits
based upon either written or unwritten governmental "policies." See Monell v. Department of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 694 (1978).
113. Springfield v. Kibbe, 107 S. Ct. 1114 (1987) (per curiam), appeared to be an appropri-
ate vehicle for resolving the issue because the First Circuit Court of Appeals had accepted a
theory of inadequate training as a basis for municipal liability. However, the Supreme Court,
in a per curiam opinion (in which Justice Brennan joined), concluded that neither the issue of
adequate training nor the standard for testing it could be decided because the municipality had
not properly preserved the issue for appellate review. Id. at 4240. The dissent, in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist joined, took the opportunity to argue that the standard should be "deliberate
indifference or reckless disregard for the consequences." Id. at 4242 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(relying heavily upon Tuttle dicta). See also Mairena v. Foti, No. 86-3238 (5th Cir. May 18,
1987) (post-Springfeld-imposing liability upon district attorney for callous indifference to the
need for proper procedures); Williams v. Butler, 802 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (rein-
stating a judgment against the city, based upon overdelegation and final authority theory, after
remand in light of Pembaur); Crane v. State of Texas, 759 F.2d 412, 427 n.15 (5th Cir.), reh'g
denied, 766 F.2d 193 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 570 (1985) (articulating a variety of
theories); Gelfand, Bicentennial, supra note 3 (discussing some implications of the different
approaches taken by Justices Rehnquist, Brennan, and Stevens).
114. See generally Williams, supra note 7, at 133-34, 152; supra notes 73 & 82-83 and
sources cited therein.
115. Compare Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.54 (1978) (no
eleventh amendment immunity for municipalities) with Edelman v. Jordon, 415 U.S. 651, 669
(1974) (eleventh amendment immunity for states). See also Pennhurst State School v. Halder-
man, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (discussed supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text). See supra notes
10-23 and accompanying text.
116. See generally MacDonald, Sommers & Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2569-
74 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
B. Service Provider Issues
Though the demise of National League of Cities was readily ac-
cepted in some quarters,1 1 7 many commentators feel that its underlying
principles need to be revived. Thus, several authors, representing a wide
range of political perspectives, I8 have argued that some form of judicial
protection for state and local governments against federal interference is
desirable. Protection of state and local government structural integrity
and modus operandi must, however, have a stronger analytical basis than
was originally provided in the National League of Cities opinion. As an
initial matter, the "Constitutional Plan""' 9 and similar broad notions of
federalism, as structured throughout the Constitution, would provide a
more enduring, though perhaps more complex, foundation than the thin
reed of the Tenth Amendment. 120 Moreover, the precise role of local
government will have to be clarified. In seeking a firmer basis for state
sovereignty, however, the Rehnquist Court should not, and indeed need
not, undercut basic individual rights. 121
The Rehnquist Court is likely to have several opportunities to revive
some form of state sovereignty, though respect for precedent may well
delay an express overruling of Garcia. It is always a hazardous enter-
prise to predict outcomes of future cases, but certain fact patterns can be
identified as likely candidates for judicial reconsideration of the issue of
protecting state and local governments from congressional interference.
They include: taxing state and local revenues under the new federal tax
law's arbitrage rebate rules, 2 2 requiring a mandatory drinking age as a
117. See, eg., Williams, supra note 7, at 114-15.
118. See, e.g., SECTION OF URBAN, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW OF THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT ON FEDERALISM TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES
(Dec. 1986); WORKING GROUP ON FEDERALISM OF THE DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL, THE
STATUS OF FEDERALISM IN AMERICA (Nov. 1986) [hereinafter WORKING GROUP]; Gelfand,
Bicentennial, supra note 3; Howard, Garcia and the Values of Federalism: On the Need for a
Recurrence to Fundamental Principles, 19 GA. L. REV. 789 (1985).
119. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 433 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see generally
Gelfand, Burger Court Federalism, supra note 1, at 814.
120. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Consititution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. The suggestion that it is a "truism," United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941), seems to have some justification, at least in the sense that the
breadth of the congressional power being challenged must be determined first before deciding
how much authority remains to the state or local government claiming some kind of "sover-
eignty." Yet, even the WORKING GROUP report, supra note 118, in calling for a revitalization
of state sovereignty, seems to rely upon the Tenth Amendment as the sole basis.
121. See Gelfand, Bicentennial, supra note 3; Howard, supra note 118, at 795-96.
122. See I.R.C. § 148(f) (1986); see generally Weiner, Federal Tax Exemption D: Arbitrage,
in STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT FINANCING, supra note 65, § 7:28.10-.60.
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condition of receiving federal highway funds,'2 3 and imposing extreme
debt financing regulations. 24 The test should be whether the challenged
federal regulations directly undercut political accountability or disrupt
the modus operandi of a state or local government acting in its capacity
as a service provider.
Conclusion
In the bicentennial year of the Constitution, the nature and contours
of the relationship between the national government and the states will
probably be thoroughly discussed. What may be overlooked in those dis-
cussions of federalism, however, is the important role of local govern-
ment in our system.
The decisions involving local government during the seventeen years
of the Burger Court have, at times, been ambiguous, even inconsistent;
however, when read together they do form a pattern which is both more
coherent and more complex than commentators have sometimes sug-
gested. As a result, the remaining years of the 1980's will require creativ-
ity on the part of the Rehnquist Court, civil rights and civil liberties
litigators, and city attorneys. This should be a very interesting period for
commentators, but a difficult one for district court judges.
123. See WORKING GROUP, supra note 118, at 69; cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 213 n.5
(1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (questioning the statistical evidence used to support the state's
claim that a law regulating the drinking age on the basis of gender could be justified as a traffic
safety measure); Gelfand, Burger Court Federalism, supra note 1, at 845-47 (questioning other,
more tangential, federal regulatory requirements). In South Dakota v. Dole, 791 F.2d 628 (8th
Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 567 (1986), the Eighth Circuit upheld a statute which
conditioned the receipt of federal highway funds upon the raising of the recipient state's drink-
ing age. The court of appeals rejected both tenth amendment and twenty-first amendment
claims.
124. South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367 (1984) (leave to file complaint granted under
Court's original jurisdiction), challenges the federal requirement that state and local obliga-
tions be issued in registered form in order to preserve their tax-exempt status. The report of
the special master was recently accepted by the Court. South Carolina v. Baker, 107 S. Ct.
1274 (1987) (mem.). See generally M.D. GELFAND & P. SALSICH, STATE AND LOCAL TAXA-
TION IN A NUTSHELL 207-10 (1985). Even if the Court finds this requirement permissible,
more extreme tax or securities laws regulating state and local debt instruments may be subject
to challenge.
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